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This paper explores the determinants of corporate failure and the pricing of financially distressed
stocks using US data over the period 1963 to 2003. Firms with higher leverage, lower profitability,
lower market capitalization, lower past stock returns, more volatile past stock returns, lower cash
holdings, higher market-book ratios, and lower prices per share are more likely to file for bankruptcy,
be delisted, or receive a D rating. When predicting failure at longer horizons, the most persistent
firm characteristics, market capitalization, the market-book ratio, and equity volatility become
relatively more significant. Our model captures much of the time variation in the aggregate failure
rate. Since 1981, financially distressed stocks have delivered anomalously low returns. They have
lower returns but much higher standard deviations, market betas, and loadings on value and
small-cap risk factors than stocks with a low risk of failure. These patterns hold in all size quintiles
but are particularly strong in smaller stocks. They are inconsistent with the conjecture that the value
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The concept of ﬁnancial distress has been invoked in the asset pricing literature to
explain otherwise anomalous patterns in the cross-section of stock returns (Chan and
Chen 1991, Fama and French 1996). The idea is that certain companies have an
elevated probability that they will fail to meet their ﬁnancial obligations; the stocks
of these ﬁnancially distressed companies tend to move together, so their risk cannot
be diversiﬁed away; and investors charge a premium for bearing such risk.2 The
premium for distress risk may not be captured by the standard Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model (CAPM) if corporate failures are correlated with deteriorating investment
opportunities (Merton 1973) or declines in unmeasured components of wealth such
as human capital (Fama and French 1996) or debt securities (Ferguson and Shockley
2003).3 In this case distress risk may help to explain patterns such as the size and
value eﬀects that are anomalies in the standard CAPM.
While this idea has a certain plausibility, it leaves some basic empirical questions
unanswered. How should we measure the failure to meet ﬁnancial obligations and the
probability that a ﬁrm will fail in the future? Given an empirical measure of ﬁnancial
distress, do the stock prices of ﬁnancially distressed companies move together, and
what returns have they generated historically? Is there any evidence that ﬁnancial
distress risk carries a premium?
2Chan and Chen (1991), for example, attribute the size premium to the prevalence of “marginal
ﬁrms” in small-stock portfolios, and describe marginal ﬁrms as follows: “They have lost market
value because of poor performance, they are ineﬃcient producers, and they are likely to have high
ﬁnancial leverage and cash ﬂow problems. They are marginal in the sense that their prices tend to
be more sensitive to changes in the economy, and they are less likely to survive adverse economic
conditions.” Fama and French (1996) use the term “relative distress” in a similar fashion.
3Fama and French (1996) explain the point as follows: “Why is relative distress a state variable
of special hedging concern to investors? One possible explanation is linked to human capital, an
important asset for most investors. Consider an investor with specialized human capital tied to a
growth ﬁrm (or industry or technology). A negative shock to the ﬁrm’s prospects probably does not
reduce the value of the investor’s human capital; it may just mean that employment in the ﬁrm will
grow less rapidly. In contrast, a negative shock to a distressed ﬁrm more likely implies a negative
shock to the value of human capital since employment in the ﬁrm is more likely to contract. Thus,
workers with specialized human capital in distressed ﬁrms have an incentive to avoid holding their
ﬁrms’ stocks. If variation in distress is correlated across ﬁrms, workers in distressed ﬁrms have an
incentive to avoid the stocks of all distressed ﬁrms. The result can be a state-variable risk premium
in the expected returns of distressed stocks.” (p.77).
1We address these questions in two steps. In the ﬁrst step we construct an empirical
measure of ﬁnancial distress, and in the second step we calculate the average returns
on distressed stocks. We start by considering two alternative ways in which a ﬁrm
m a yf a i lt om e e ti t sﬁnancial obligations. First, we look at bankruptcy ﬁlings under
either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Second, we look at failures,
deﬁned more broadly to include bankruptcies, delistings, or D (“default”) ratings
issued by a leading credit rating agency. The broader deﬁnition of failure allows
us to capture at least some cases where ﬁrms avoid bankruptcy by negotiating with
creditors out of court (Gilson, John, and Lang 1990, Gilson 1997). It also captures
ﬁrms that perform so poorly that their stocks are delisted from the exchange, an
event which sometimes precedes bankruptcy or formal default.
To measure the probability that a ﬁrm enters either bankruptcy or failure, we
adopt a relatively atheoretical econometric approach. We estimate a dynamic panel
model using a logit speciﬁcation, following Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow
(2004), and others. We extend the previous literature by considering a wide range
of explanatory variables, including both accounting and equity-market variables, and
by explicitly considering how the optimal speciﬁcation varies with the horizon of the
forecast. Some papers on bankruptcy concentrate on predicting the event that a
bankruptcy will occur during the next month. Over such a short horizon, it should
not be surprising that the recent return on a ﬁrm’s equity is a powerful predictor, but
this may not be very useful information if it is relevant only in the extremely short
run, just as it would not be useful to predict a heart attack by observing a person
dropping to the ﬂoor clutching his chest. We also explore time-series variation in the
number of bankruptcies, and ask how much of this variation is explained by changes
over time in the variables that predict bankruptcy at the ﬁrm level.
Our empirical work begins with monthly bankruptcy and failure indicators pro-
vided by Kamakura Risk Information Services (KRIS). The bankruptcy indicator was
used by Chava and Jarrow (2004), and covers the period from January 1963 through
December 1998. The failure indicator runs from January 1963 through December
2003. We merge these datasets with ﬁrm level accounting data from COMPUSTAT
as well as monthly and daily equity price data from CRSP. This gives us about 800
bankruptcies, 1600 failures, and predictor variables for 1.7 million ﬁrm months.
We start by estimating a basic speciﬁcation used by Shumway (2001) and similar
to that of Chava and Jarrow (2004). The model includes both equity market and
accounting data. From the equity market, we measure the excess stock return of each
2company over the past month, the volatility of daily stock returns over the past three
months, and the market capitalization of each company. From accounting data, we
measure net income as a ratio to assets, and total leverage as a ratio to assets. We
obtain similar coeﬃcient estimates whether we are predicting bankruptcies through
1998, failures through 1998, or failures through 2003.
From this starting point, we make a number of contributions to the prediction of
corporate bankruptcies and failures. First, we explore some sensible modiﬁcations to
the variables listed above. Speciﬁcally, we show that scaling net income and leverage
by the market value of assets rather than the book value, and adding further lags of
stock returns and net income, can improve the explanatory power of the benchmark
regression.
Second, we explore some additional variables and ﬁnd that corporate cash hold-
ings, the market-book ratio, and a ﬁrm’s price per share contribute explanatory power.
In a related exercise we construct a measure of distance to default, based on the prac-
titioner model of Moody’s KMV (Crosbie and Bohn 2001) and ultimately on the
structural default model of Merton (1974). We ﬁnd that this measure adds relatively
little explanatory power to the reduced-form variables already included in our model.4
Third, we examine what happens to our speciﬁcation as we increase the horizon
at which we are trying to predict failure. Consistent with our expectations, we
ﬁnd that our most persistent forecasting variable, market capitalization, becomes
relatively more important as we predict further into the future. Volatility and the
market-book ratio also become more important at long horizons relative to net income,
leverage, and recent equity returns.
Fourth, we study time-variation in the number of failures. We compare the
realized frequency of failure to the predicted frequency over time. Although the
model underpredicts the frequency of failure in the 1980s and overpredicts it in the
1990s, the model ﬁts the general time pattern quite well.
In the second part of this paper, we use our ﬁtted probability of failure as a
measure of ﬁnancial distress and calculate the risks and average returns on portfolios
of stocks sorted by this ﬁtted probability. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms
have high market betas and high loadings on the HML and SMB factors proposed
4This ﬁnding is consistent with recent results of Bharath and Shumway (2004), circulated after
the ﬁrst version of this paper.
3by Fama and French (1993, 1996) to capture the value and size eﬀects. However
they have low, not high, average returns, suggesting that the equity market has not
properly priced distress risk.
We show that the low returns to distressed stocks are not concentrated around
earnings announcements, suggesting that the anomaly does not result from overopti-
mistic investor expectations about future earnings. We also show that almost all the
variables in our failure prediction model contribute to these low returns, so that the
anomaly does not reﬂect simply momentum in small loser stocks (Hong, Lim, and
Stein 2000), low returns to volatile stocks (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 2006), or
other phenomena already documented in the asset pricing literature.
We report some suggestive time-series correlations between the returns to dis-
tressed stocks and aggregate developments in ﬁnancial markets. We show that
returns to distressed stocks are particularly low when the implied volatility of the
S&P 500 index, measured by the VIX, increases. This implies that distressed stocks
are vulnerable to increases in marketwide risk or risk aversion, but it does not help
explain the low returns to these stocks as increases in the VIX are normally taken
to be negative events, and stocks that do poorly at such times typically have high
average returns (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 2006). Finally, we show that the
low returns to distressed stocks are correlated with increases in the share of corpo-
rate equities owned by institutions that make 13-F ﬁlings to the SEC. This suggests
that institutional aversion to distressed stocks may have depressed the prices of these
stocks during our sample period.
A large related literature studies the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. The
literature varies in the choice of variables to predict bankruptcy and the methodology
used to estimate the likelihood of bankruptcy. Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Ohlson
(1980), and Zmijewski (1984) use accounting variables to estimate the probability of
bankruptcy in a static model. Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s O-score have become
popular and widely accepted measures of ﬁnancial distress. They are used, for
example, by Dichev (1998), Griﬃn and Lemmon (2002), and Ferguson and Shockley
(2003) to explore the risks and average returns for distressed ﬁrms. A parallel
literature uses accounting variables to predict credit ratings, which can be interpreted
as subjective default probabilities provided by credit rating agencies (Kaplan and
Urwitz 1979, Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay 1998, Molina 2005).
Shumway (2001) estimates a hazard model at annual frequency and adds equity
market variables to the set of scaled accounting measures used in the earlier literature.
4He points out that estimating the probability of bankruptcy in a static setting intro-
duces biases and overestimates the impact of the predictor variables. This is because
the static model does not take into account that a ﬁrm could have had unfavorable
indicators several periods before going into bankruptcy. Other recent papers using
the hazard approach include Chava and Jarrow (2004), who work with monthly data
and explore industry eﬀects, and Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005), who explore
the stability of the coeﬃcients over time.
Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2006) emphasize that the probability of failure depends
on the horizon one is considering. They estimate mean-reverting time series processes
for macroeconomic and ﬁrm-speciﬁc predictors of failure and combine these with a
short-horizon failure model to ﬁnd the marginal probabilities of failure at diﬀerent
horizons. We conduct a similar exercise using a reduced-form econometric approach;
we do not model the time-series evolution of the predictor variables but instead di-
rectly estimate longer-term failure probabilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
construction of the data set, outlier analysis and summary statistics. Section 3
discusses our basic monthly panel model, extensions to it, and the eﬀects of estimating
the model at longer horizons. This section also considers the ability of the model
to ﬁt the aggregate time series of failures. Section 4 studies the return properties of
e q u i t yp o r t f o l i o sf o r m e do nt h eﬁtted value from our bankruptcy prediction model.
We ask whether stocks with high bankruptcy probability have unusually high or low
returns relative to the predictions of standard cross-sectional asset pricing models
such as the CAPM or the three-factor Fama-French model. Section 5 concludes.
2D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n
In order to estimate a dynamic logit model we need an indicator of ﬁnancial distress
and a set of explanatory variables. The bankruptcy indicator we use is taken from
Chava and Jarrow (2004); it includes all bankruptcy ﬁlings in the Wall Street Journal
Index, the SDC database, SEC ﬁlings and the CCH Capital Changes Reporter. The
indicator equals one in a month in which a ﬁrm ﬁled for bankruptcy under Chapter
7 or Chapter 11, and zero otherwise; in particular, the indicator is zero if the ﬁrm
disappears from the dataset for some reason other than bankruptcy such as acquisi-
tion or delisting. The data span the months from January 1963 through December
51998. We also consider a broader failure indicator, which equals one if a ﬁrm ﬁles
for bankruptcy, delists, or receives a D rating, over the period January 1963 through
December 2003.
Table 1 summarizes the properties of our bankruptcy and failure indicators. The
ﬁrst column shows the number of active ﬁrms in the CRSP database in each year.
The second column shows the number of bankruptcies, and the third column the
corresponding percentage of active ﬁrms that went bankrupt in each year. The
fourth and ﬁfth columns repeat this information for our failure series.
It is immediately apparent that bankruptcies were extremely rare until the late
1960’s. In fact, in the three years 1967—1969 there were no bankruptcies at all
in our dataset. The bankruptcy rate increased in the early 1970’s, and then rose
dramatically during the 1980’s to a peak of 1.5% in 1986. It remained high through
the economic slowdown of the early 1990’s, but fell in the late 1990’s to levels only
slightly above those that prevailed in the 1970’s.
Some of these changes through time are probably the result of changes in the
law governing corporate bankruptcy in the 1970’s, and related ﬁnancial innovations
such as the development of below-investment-grade public debt (junk bonds) in the
1980’s and the advent of prepackaged bankruptcy ﬁlings in the early 1990’s (Tashjian,
Lease, and McConnell 1996). Changes in corporate capital structure (Bernanke and
Campbell 1988) and the riskiness of corporate activities (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu 2001) are also likely to have played a role, and one purpose of our investigation
is to quantify the time-series eﬀects of these changes.
The broader failure indicator tracks the bankruptcy indicator closely until the
early 1980’s, but towards the end of the sample it begins to diverge signiﬁcantly. The
number of failures increases dramatically after 1998, reﬂecting the ﬁnancial distress
of many young ﬁrms that were newly listed during the boom of the late 1990’s.
In order to construct explanatory variables at the individual ﬁrm level, we com-
bine quarterly accounting data from COMPUSTAT with monthly and daily equity
market data from CRSP. From COMPUSTAT we construct a standard measure of
proﬁtability: net income relative to total assets. Previous authors have measured
total assets at book value, but we measure the equity component of total assets at
market value by adding the book value of liabilities to the market value of equities.
We call the resulting proﬁtability ratio NIMTA (Net Income to Market-valued Total
Assets) and the traditional series NITA (Net Income to Total Assets). We ﬁnd that
6NIMTA has stronger explanatory power, perhaps because market prices more rapidly
incorporate new information about the ﬁrm’s prospects or more accurately reﬂect
intangible assets of the ﬁr m . W ea l s ou s eC O M P U S T A Tt oc o n s t r u c tam e a s u r eo f
leverage: total liabilities relative to total assets. We again ﬁnd that a market-valued
v e r s i o no ft h i ss e r i e s ,d e ﬁned as total liabilities divided by the sum of market equity
and book liabilities, performs better than the traditional book-valued series. We
call the two series TLMTA and TLTA, respectively. To these standard measures of
proﬁtability and leverage, we add a measure of liquidity, the ratio of a company’s
cash and short-term assets to the market value of its assets (CASHMTA). We also
calculate each ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio (MB).
In constructing these series we adjust the book value of assets to eliminate outliers,
following the procedure suggested by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003). That
is, we add 10% of the diﬀerence between market and book equity to the book value
of total assets, thereby increasing book values that are extremely small, probably
mismeasured, and create outliers when used as the denominators of ﬁnancial ratios.
Af e wﬁrms still have negative values for book equity even after this adjustment, and
we replace these negative values with small positive values. We also winsorize all
variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles of their cross-sectional distributions. That
is, we replace any observation below the 5th percentile with the 5th percentile, and
any observation above the 95th percentile with the 95th percentile. We align each
company’s ﬁscal year appropriately with the calendar year, converting Compustat
ﬁscal-year data to a calendar basis, and then lag accounting data by two months.
This adjustment ensures that the accounting data are available at the beginning of
the month over which bankruptcy is measured. The Appendix to this paper describes
the construction of these variables in greater detail.
We add several market-based variables to these two accounting variables. We
calculate the monthly log excess return on each ﬁrm’s equity relative to the S&P 500
index (EXRET), the standard deviation of each ﬁrm’s daily stock return over the
p a s tt h r e em o n t h s( S I G M A ) ,a n dt h er e l a t i v es i z eo fe a c hﬁrm measured as the log
ratio of its market capitalization to that of the S&P 500 index (RSIZE). Finally,
we calculate each ﬁrm’s log price per share, truncated above at $15 (PRICE). This
captures a tendency for distressed ﬁrms to trade at low prices per share, without
reverse-splitting to bring price per share back into a more normal range.
72.1 Summary statistics
Table 2 summarizes the properties of our ten main explanatory variables. The ﬁrst
panel in Table 2 describes the distributions of the variables in almost 1.7 million ﬁrm-
months with complete data availability, the second panel describes a much smaller
sample of almost 800 bankruptcy months, and the third panel describes just over
1600 failure months.5
In interpreting these distributions, it is important to keep in mind that we weight
every ﬁrm-month equally. This has two important consequences. First, the distri-
butions are dominated by the behavior of relatively small companies; value-weighted
distributions look quite diﬀerent. Second, the distributions reﬂect the inﬂuence of
both cross-sectional and time-series variation. The cross-sectional averages of several
variables, in particular NIMTA, TLMTA, and SIGMA, have experienced signiﬁcant
trends since 1963: SIGMA and TLMTA have trended up, while NIMTA has trended
down. The downward trend in NIMTA is not just a consequence of the buoyant
stock market of the 1990’s, because book-based net income, NITA, displays a similar
trend. These trends reﬂect increasingly conservative accounting (Basu 1997) and
the tendency for companies to go public earlier in their lifecycle when they are still
unproﬁtable.6
These facts help to explain several features of Table 2. The mean level of NIMTA,
for example, is almost exactly zero (in fact, very slightly negative). This is lower
than the median level of NIMTA, which is positive at 0.6% per quarter or 2.4% at an
annual rate, because the distribution of proﬁtability is negatively skewed. The gap
between mean and median is even larger for NITA. All these measures of proﬁtability
are strikingly low, reﬂecting the prevalence of small, unproﬁtable listed companies in
recent years. Value-weighted mean proﬁtability is considerably higher.7
5For a ﬁrm-month to be included in Table 2, we must observe leverage, proﬁtability, excess return,
and market capitalization. We do not require a valid measure of volatility, and replace SIGMA
with its cross-sectional mean when this variable is missing.
6The inﬂuence of these trends is magniﬁed by the growth in the number of companies and the
availability of quarterly accounting data over time, which means that recent years have greater
inﬂuence on the distribution than earlier years. In particular, there is a scarcity of quarterly
Compustat data before the early 1970’s so years before 1973 have very little inﬂuence on our empirical
results.
7In addition, the distributions of NIMTA and NITA have large spikes just above zero, a phe-
nomenon noted by Hayn (1995). There is a debate in the accounting literature about this spike.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) argue that it reﬂects earnings management to avoid losses, but De-
8The average value of EXRET is -0.011 or -1.1% per month. This extremely low
number reﬂects both the underperformance of small stocks during the later part of
our sample period (the value-weighted mean is almost exactly zero), and the fact that
we are reporting a geometric average excess return rather than an arithmetic average.
The diﬀerence is substantial because individual stock returns are extremely volatile.
The average value of the annualized ﬁrm-level volatility SIGMA is 56%, again re-
ﬂecting the strong inﬂuence of small ﬁrms and recent years in which idiosyncratic
volatility has been high (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu 2001).
A comparison of the top and the second panel of Table 2 reveals that bankrupt
ﬁrms have intuitive diﬀerences from the rest of the sample. In months immediately
preceding a bankruptcy ﬁling, ﬁrms typically make losses (the mean loss is 4.0%
quarterly or 16% of market value of assets at an annual rate, and the median loss is
4.7% quarterly or almost 19% at an annual rate); the value of their debts is extremely
high relative to their assets (average leverage is almost 80%, and median leverage
exceeds 87%); they have experienced extremely negative returns over the past month
(the mean is -11.5% over a month, while the median is -17% over a month); and
their volatility is extraordinarily high (the mean annualized volatility is 106% and
the median is 126%). Bankrupt ﬁrms also tend to be relatively small (about 7 times
smaller than other ﬁrms on average, and 10 times smaller at the median), and they
have only about half as much cash and short-term investments, in relation to the
market value of assets, as non-bankrupt ﬁrms.
The market-book ratio of bankrupt ﬁrms has a slightly higher mean and a much
higher standard deviation than the market-book ratio of other ﬁrms. It appears that
some ﬁrms go bankrupt after realized losses have driven down their book values rela-
tive to market values, while others go bankrupt after bad news about future prospects
has driven down their market values relative to book values. Thus bankruptcy is
associated with a wide spread in the market-book ratio.
Finally, ﬁrms that go bankrupt typically have low prices per share. The mean
price per share is just over $1.50 for a bankrupt ﬁrm, while the median price per share
is slightly below $1.
The third panel of Table 2 reports the summary statistics for our failure sample
through December 2003. The patterns are similar to those in the second panel, but
some eﬀects are stronger for failures than for bankruptcies (losses are more extreme,
chow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) and Durtschi and Easton (2004) challenge this interpretation.
9volatility is higher, price per share is lower, and market capitalization is considerably
smaller), while other eﬀects are weaker (leverage is less extreme and cash holdings
are higher).
3 A logit model of bankruptcy and failure
The summary statistics in Table 2 show that bankrupt and failed ﬁrms have a num-
ber of unusual characteristics. However the number of bankruptcies and failures is
tiny compared to the number of ﬁrm-months in our dataset, so it is not at all clear
how useful these variables are in predicting bankruptcy. Also, these characteristics
are correlated with one another and we would like to know how to weight them op-
timally. Following Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004), we now estimate
the probabilities of bankruptcy and failure over the next period using a logit model.
We assume that the marginal probability of bankruptcy or failure over the next
period follows a logistic distribution and is given by
Pt−1 (Yit =1 )=
1
1+e x p( −α − βxi,t−1)
(1)
where Yit is an indicator that equals one if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt or fails in month
t,a n dxi,t−1 is a vector of explanatory variables known at the end of the previous
month. A higher level of α + βxi,t−1 implies a higher probability of bankruptcy or
failure.
Table 3 reports logit regression results for various alternative speciﬁcations. In
the ﬁrst three columns we follow Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004),
and estimate a model with ﬁve standard variables: NITA, TLTA, EXRET, SIGMA,
and RSIZE. This model measures assets in the conventional way, using annual book
values from COMPUSTAT. It excludes ﬁrm age, a variable which Shumway (2001)
considered but found to be insigniﬁcant in predicting bankruptcy. Column 1 esti-
mates the model for bankruptcy over the period 1963-1998, column 2 estimates it for
failure over the same period, and column 3 looks at failure over the entire 1963-2003
period.
All ﬁve of the included variables in the Shumway (2001) bankruptcy model enter
signiﬁcantly and with the expected sign. As we broaden the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial
10distress to failure, and as we include more recent data, the eﬀects of market capital-
ization and volatility become stronger, while the eﬀects of losses, leverage, and recent
past returns become slightly weaker.
In columns 4, 5, and 6 we report results for an alternative model that modiﬁes the
Shumway speciﬁcation in several ways. First, we replace the traditional accounting
ratios NITA and TLTA that use the book value of assets, with our ratios NIMTA and
TLMTA that use the market value of assets. These measures are more sensitive to
new information about ﬁrm prospects since equity values are measured using monthly
market data rather than quarterly accounting data.
Second, we add lagged information about proﬁtability and excess stock returns.
One might expect that a long history of losses or a sustained decline in stock market
value would be a better predictor of bankruptcy than one large quarterly loss or a
sudden stock price decline in a single month. Exploratory regressions with lagged
values conﬁrm that lags of NIMTA and EXRET enter signiﬁcantly, while lags of the
other variables do not. As a reasonable summary, we impose geometrically declining














12(EXRETt−1 + ... + φ
11EXRETt−12), (3)
where the coeﬃcient φ =2 −1
3, implying that the weight is halved each quarter.
When lagged excess returns or proﬁtability are missing, we replace them with their
cross-sectional means in order to avoid losing observations. The data suggest that
this parsimonious speciﬁcation captures almost all the predictability obtainable from
lagged proﬁtability and stock returns.
Third, we add the ratio of cash and short-term investments to the market value of
total assets, CASHMTA, in order to capture the liquidity position of the ﬁrm. A ﬁrm
with a high CASHMTA ratio has liquid assets available to make interest payments,
and thus may be able to postpone bankruptcy with the possibility of avoiding it
altogether if circumstances improve.8
8We also considered more traditional measures of working capital, the current ratio of current
11Fourth, the market-book ratio, MB, captures the relative value placed on the ﬁrm’s
equity by stockholders and by accountants. Our proﬁtability and leverage ratios use
market value; if book value is also relevant, then MB may enter the regression as
a correction factor, increasing the probability of bankruptcy when market value is
unusually high relative to book value. Recall from Table 2 that the average market-
book ratio is slightly higher for bankrupt ﬁrms, so there may also be a modest direct
eﬀect of overvaluation on failure probability.9
Finally, we add the log price per share of the ﬁrm, PRICE. We expect this
variable to be relevant for low prices per share, particularly since both the NYSE
and the Nasdaq have a minimum price per share of $1 and commonly delist stocks
that fail to meet this minimum (Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio 2004). Reverse stock
splits are sometimes used to keep stock prices away from the $1 minimum level, but
these often have negative eﬀects on returns and therefore on market capitalization,
suggesting that investors interpret reverse stock splits as a negative signal about
company prospects (Woolridge and Chambers 1983, Hwang 1995). Exploratory
analysis suggested that price per share is relevant below $15, and so we truncate
price per share at this level before taking the log.
All the new variables in our model enter the logit regression with the expected sign
and are highly statistically signiﬁcant. After accounting for diﬀerences in the scaling
of the variables, there is little eﬀect on the coeﬃcients of the variables already included
in the Shumway model, with the important exception of market capitalization. This
variable is strongly correlated with log price per share; once price per share is included,
market capitalization enters with a weak positive coeﬃcient, probably as an ad hoc
correction to the negative eﬀect of price per share.
To get some idea of the relative impact of changes in the diﬀerent variables,
we compute the proportional impact on the failure probability of a one-standard-
deviation increase in each predictor variable for a ﬁrm that initially has sample mean
values of the predictor variables. Such an increase in proﬁtability reduces the probabil-
ity of failure by 44% of its initial value; the corresponding eﬀects are a 156% increase
for leverage, a 28% reduction for past excess return, a 64% increase for volatility,
a 17% increase for market capitalization, a 21% reduction for cash holdings, a 9%
assets to current liabilities, and the acid test ratio of cash, short-term investments, and receivables
to current liabilities. These variables are slightly less eﬀective predictors than CASHMTA, perhaps
because our ratio uses the market value of assets in the denominator.
9Chacko, Hecht, and Hilscher (2004) discuss the measurement of credit risk when the market-to-
book ratio is inﬂuenced both by cash ﬂow expectations and discount rates.
12increase for the market-book ratio, and a 56% reduction for price per share. Thus
variations in leverage, volatility, price per share, and proﬁtability are more important
for failure risk than movements in market capitalization, cash, or the market-book
ratio. These magnitudes roughly line up with the t statistics reported in Table 3.
Our proposed model delivers a noticeable improvement in explanatory power over
the Shumway model. We report McFadden’s pseudo R2 coeﬃcient for each speciﬁ-
cation, calculated as 1−L1/L0,w h e r eL1 is the log likelihood of the estimated model
and L0 is the log likelihood of a null model that includes only a constant term. The
pseudo R2 coeﬃcient increases from 0.26 to 0.30 in predicting bankruptcies or failures
over 1963—1998, and from 0.27 to 0.31 in predicting failures over 1963—2003.
3.1 Forecasting at long horizons
At the one month horizon our best speciﬁcation captures about 30% of the variation in
bankruptcy risk. We now ask what happens as we try to predict bankruptcies further
into the future. In Table 4 we estimate the conditional probability of bankruptcy
in six months, one, two and three years. We again assume a logit speciﬁcation but
allow the coeﬃcients on the variables to vary with the horizon of the prediction. In
particular we assume that the probability of bankruptcy in j months, conditional on
survival in the dataset for j − 1 months, is given by






Note that this assumption does not imply a cumulative probability of bankruptcy
that is logit. If the probability of bankruptcy in j months did not change with the
horizon j,t h a ti si fαj = α and βj = β,a n di fﬁrms exited the dataset only through
bankruptcy, then the cumulative probability of bankruptcy over the next j periods
would be given by 1 − (exp(−α − βxi)/(1 + exp(−α − βxi))j, which no longer has
the logit form. Variation in the parameters with the horizon j, and exit from the
dataset through mergers and acquisitions, only make this problem worse. In principle
we could compute the cumulative probability of bankruptcy by estimating models
for each horizon j and integrating appropriately; or by using our one-period model
and making auxiliary assumptions about the time-series evolution of the predictor
variables in the manner of Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2006). We do not pursue these
13possibilities here, concentrating instead on the conditional probabilities of default at
particular dates in the future.
As the horizon increases in Table 4, the coeﬃcients, signiﬁcance levels, and overall
ﬁt of the logit regression decline as one would expect. Even at three years, however,
almost all the variables remain statistically signiﬁcant.
Three predictor variables are particularly important at long horizons. The co-
eﬃcient and t statistic on volatility SIGMA are almost unchanged as the horizon
increases; the coeﬃcient and t statistic on the market-to-book ratio MB increase with
the horizon; and the coeﬃcient on relative market capitalization RSIZE switches sign,
becoming increasingly signiﬁcant with the expected negative sign as the horizon in-
creases. These variables, market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, and volatility,
are persistent attributes of a ﬁrm that become increasingly important measures of
ﬁnancial distress at long horizons. Log price per share also switches sign, presum-
ably as a result of the previously noted correlation between this variable and market
capitalization.
Leverage and past excess stock returns have coeﬃcients that decay particularly
rapidly with the horizon, suggesting that these are primarily short-term signals of
ﬁnancial distress. Proﬁtability and cash holdings are intermediate, with eﬀects that
decay more slowly. Overall, market-based variables become more important relative
to accounting variables as we increase the forecast horizon. This pattern is not just
due to our use of quarterly accounting data, as we ﬁnd very similar results if we
estimate our model using annual accounting data.
In Table 4 the number of observations and number of failures vary with the horizon,
because increasing the horizon forces us to drop observations at both the beginning
and end of the dataset. Failures that occur within the ﬁrst j months of the sample
cannot be related to the condition of the ﬁrm j months previously, and the last j
months of the sample cannot be used to predict failures that may occur after the end
of the sample. Also, many ﬁrms exit the dataset for other reasons between dates t−1
and t−1+j. On the other hand, as we lengthen the horizon we can include failures
that are immediately preceded by missing data. We have run the same regressions
for a subset of ﬁrms for which data are available at all the diﬀerent horizons. This
allows us to compare R2 statistics directly across horizons. We obtain very similar
results to those reported in Table 4, telling us that variation in the available data is
not responsible for our ﬁndings.
143.2 Comparison with distance to default
A leading alternative to the reduced-form econometric approach we have implemented
in this paper is the structural approach of Moody’s KMV (Crosbie and Bohn 2001),
based on the structural default model of Merton (1974). This approach uses the
Merton model to construct “distance to default”, DD, a measure of the diﬀerence
between the asset value of the ﬁrm and the face value of its debt, scaled by the
standard deviation of the ﬁrm’s asset value. Taken literally, the Merton model implies
a deterministic relationship between DD and the probability of default, but in practice
this relationship is estimated by a nonparametric regression of a bankruptcy or failure
indicator on DD. That is, the historical frequency of bankruptcy is calculated for
ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of DD, and this historical frequency is used as an estimate
of the probability of bankruptcy going forward.
To implement the structural approach, we calculate DD in the manner of Hil-
legeist, Keating, Cram, and Lunstedt (2004) by solving a system of two nonlinear
equations. The details of the calculation are described in the Appendix. Table 5
compares the predictive power of the structural model with that of our best reduced-
form model. The top panel reports the coeﬃcients on DD in a simple regression of
our failure indicator on DD, and in a multiple regression on DD and the variables
included in our reduced-form model. DD enters with the expected negative sign and
is highly signiﬁcant in the simple regression. In the multiple regression, however, it
enters with a positive sign at a short horizon, presumably because the reduced-form
model already includes volatility and leverage, which are the two main inputs to the
calculation of DD. The coeﬃcient on DD only becomes negative and signiﬁcant when
the horizon is extended to one or three years.
The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the pseudo R2 statistics for these regressions.
While the structural model achieves a respectable R2 of 16% for short-term failure
prediction, our reduced-form model almost doubles this number. Adding DD to the
reduced-form model has very little eﬀect on the R2, which is to be expected given
the presence of volatility and leverage in the reduced-form model. These results hold
both when we calculate R2 in-sample, using coeﬃcients estimated over the entire
period 1963-2003, and when we calculate it out-of-sample, using coeﬃcients each
year from 1981 onwards that were estimated over the period up to but not including
that year. The two sets of R2 are very similar because most failures occur towards
the end of the dataset, when the full-sample model and the rolling model have very
similar coeﬃcients.
15The structural approach is designed to forecast default at a horizon of one year.
This suggests that it might perform relatively better as we forecast failure further
into the future. It is true that DD enters our model signiﬁcantly with the correct
sign at longer horizons, but Table 5 shows that the relative performance of DD and
our econometric model is relatively constant across forecast horizons.
We conclude that the structural approach captures important aspects of the
process determining corporate failure. The predictive power of DD is quite impres-
sive given the tight restrictions on functional form imposed by the Merton model. If
one’s goal is to predict failures, however, it is clearly better to use a reduced-form
econometric approach that allows volatility and leverage to enter with free coeﬃ-
cients and that includes other relevant variables. Bharath and Shumway (2004), in
independent recent work, reach a similar conclusion.
3.3 Other time-series and cross-sectional eﬀects
As we noted in our discussion of Table 1, there is considerable variation in the failure
rate over time. We now ask how well our model ﬁts this pattern. We ﬁrst calculate
the ﬁtted probability of failure for each company in our dataset using the coeﬃcients
from our best reduced-form model. We then average over all the predicted probabil-
ities to obtain a prediction of the aggregate failure rate among companies with data
available for failure prediction.
Figure 1 shows annual averages of predicted and realized failures, expressed as a
fraction of the companies with available data.10 Our model captures much of the
broad variation in corporate failures over time, including the strong and long-lasting
increase in the 1980’s and cyclical spikes in the early 1990’s and early 2000’s. However
it somewhat overpredicts failures in 1974-5, underpredicts for much of the 1980’s, and
then overpredicts in the early 1990’s.
Deviations of the aggregate failure rate from the predictions of a model like ours
c a nb ec a u s e db ys h o c k st h a ta r ec o r r e l a t e da c r o s sﬁrms, and possibly over time. The
eﬀect of correlated shocks is sometimes referred to as frailty (Das, Duﬃe, Kapadia,
and Saita 2005, Duﬃe, Eckner, Horel, and Saita 2006). Correlated shocks could
10The realized failure rate among these companies is slightly diﬀerent from the failure rate reported
in Table 1, which includes all failures and all active companies, not just those with data available
for failure prediction.
16result from structural changes in corporate ﬁnance such as the creation of the junk
bond market, from macroeconomic events such as recessions whose inﬂuence is not
fully captured by the explanatory variables in our model, or from direct eﬀects of one
corporate failure on other distressed corporations. To examine the importance of
such shocks, we have considered year dummies that shift the baseline probability of
bankruptcy from one year to the next. We have run bankruptcy prediction regres-
sions on a set of year dummies only, and on both year dummies and our explanatory
variables. We can reject the hypothesis that time eﬀects can be omitted from our
model, but ﬁnd that the model captures a large share of the time-variation in bank-
ruptcies.11 Given our focus on diﬀerences in distress risk across ﬁrms and the pricing
of distressed stocks, we do not pursue this issue further here.
We have also explored the possibility that there are industry eﬀects on bankruptcy
and failure risk. The Shumway (2001) and Chava-Jarrow (2004) speciﬁcation appears
to behave somewhat diﬀerently in the ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sec-
tor. That sector has a lower intercept and a more negative coeﬃcient on proﬁtability.
However there is no strong evidence of sector eﬀects in our best model, which relies
more heavily on equity market data.
We have also used market capitalization and leverage as interaction variables, to
test the hypotheses that other ﬁrm-speciﬁc explanatory variables enter diﬀerently for
small or highly indebted ﬁrms than for other ﬁrms. We have found no clear evidence
that such interactions are important.
4 Risks and average returns on distressed stocks
We now turn our attention to the asset pricing implications of our failure model.
Recent work on the distress premium has tended to use either traditional risk indices
such as the Altman Z-score or Ohlson O-score (Dichev 1998, Griﬃn and Lemmon
2002, Ferguson and Shockley 2003) or the distance to default measure of KMV (Vas-
salou and Xing 2004, Da and Gao 2004). To the extent that our reduced-form model
more accurately measures the risk of failure at short and long horizons, we can more
11We have also considered interacting macroeconomic variables with ﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s . W e
ﬁnd that the AAA-BAA credit spread and the Treasury term spread interact with ﬁrms’ size and
leverage to predict bankruptcy. A more complex model including such terms further reduces the
importance of time eﬀects.
17accurately measure the premium that investors receive for holding distressed stocks.
We measure the premium for ﬁnancial distress by sorting stocks according to their
failure probabilities, estimated using the 12-month-ahead model of Table 4. Each
January from 1981 through 2003, the model is reestimated using only historically
available data to eliminate look-ahead bias. We then form ten value-weighted port-
folios of stocks that fall in diﬀerent regions of the failure risk distribution. We
minimize turnover costs and the eﬀects of bid-ask bounce by eliminating stocks with
prices less than $1 at the portfolio construction date, and by holding the portfolios for
a year, allowing the weights to drift with returns within the year rather than rebal-
ancing monthly in response to updated failure probabilities.12 Our portfolios contain
stocks in percentiles 0—5, 5—10, 10—20, 20—40, 40—60, 60—80, 80—90, 90—95, 95—99, and
99—100 of the failure risk distribution. This portfolio construction procedure pays
greater attention to the tails of the distribution, where the distress premium is likely
to be more relevant, and particularly to the most distressed ﬁrms. We also construct
long-short portfolios that go long the 10% or 20% of stocks with the lowest failure
risk, and short the 10% or 20% of stocks with the highest failure risk.
Because we are studying the returns to distressed stocks, it is important to handle
carefully the returns to stocks that are delisted and thus disappear from the CRSP
database. In many cases CRSP reports a delisting return for the ﬁnal month of
the ﬁrm’s life; we have 6,481 such delisting returns in our sample and we use them
where they are available. Otherwise, we use the last available full-month return in
CRSP. In some cases this eﬀectively assumes that our portfolios sell distressed stocks
at the end of the month before delisting, which imparts an upward bias to the returns
on distressed-stock portfolios (Shumway 1997, Shumway and Warther 1999).13 We
assume that the proceeds from sales of delisted stocks are reinvested in each portfolio
in proportion to the weights of the remaining stocks in the portfolio. In a few cases,
stocks are delisted and then re-enter the database, but we do not include these stocks
in the sample after the ﬁrst delisting. We treat ﬁrms that fail as equivalent to
delisted ﬁrms, even if CRSP continues to report returns for these ﬁrms. That is, our
portfolios sell stocks of companies that fail and we use the latest available CRSP data
to calculate a ﬁn a lr e t u r no ns u c hs t o c k s .
12In the ﬁrst version of this paper we calculated returns on portfolios rebalanced monthly, and
obtained similar results to those reported here.
13In the ﬁrst version of this paper we did not use CRSP delisting returns. The portfolio results
were similar to those reported here.
18Table 6 reports the results. Each portfolio corresponds to one column of the
table. Panel A reports average simple returns in excess of the market, in annualized
percentage points, with t statistics below in parentheses, and then alphas with respect
to the CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and a four-factor
model proposed by Carhart (1997) that also includes a momentum factor. Panel B
reports estimated factor loadings for excess returns on the three Fama-French factors,
again with t statistics. Panel C reports some relevant characteristics for the portfolios:
the annualized standard deviation and skewness of each portfolio’s excess return, the
value-weighted mean standard deviation and skewness of the individual stock returns
in each portfolio, and value-weighted means of RSIZE, market-book, and estimated
failure probability for each portfolio. Figures 2 and 3 graphically summarize the
behavior of factor loadings and alphas.
The average excess returns reported in the ﬁrst row of Table 6 are strongly and
almost monotonically declining in failure risk. The average excess returns for the
lowest-risk 5% of stocks are positive at 3.4% per year, and the average excess returns
for the highest-risk 1% of stocks are signiﬁcantly negative at -17.0% per year. A
long-short portfolio holding the safest decile of stocks and shorting the most distressed
decile has an average return of 10.0% per year and a standard deviation of 26%, so
its Sharpe ratio is comparable to that of the aggregate stock market.
There is striking variation in factor loadings across the portfolios in Table 6. The
low-failure-risk portfolios have negative market betas for their excess returns (that
is, betas less than one for their raw returns), negative loadings on the value factor
HML, and negative loadings on the small ﬁrm factor SMB. The high-failure-risk
portfolios have positive market betas for their excess returns, positive loadings on
HML, and extremely high loadings on SMB, reﬂecting the prevalence of small ﬁrms
among distressed stocks.
These factor loadings imply that when we correct for risk using either the CAPM
or the Fama-French three-factor model, we worsen the anomalous poor performance
of distressed stocks rather than correcting it. A long-short portfolio that holds the
safest decile of stocks and shorts the decile with the highest failure risk has an average
excess return of 10.0% with a t statistic of 1.9; it has a CAPM alpha of 12.4% with
a t statistic of 2.3; and it has a Fama-French three-factor alpha of 22.7% with a t
statistic of 6.1. When we use the Fama-French model to correct for risk, all portfolios
beyond the 60th percentile of the failure risk distribution have statistically signiﬁcant
negative alphas.
19One of the variables that predicts failure in our model is recent past return. This
suggests that distressed stocks have negative momentum, which might explain their
low average returns. To control for this, Table 6 also reports alphas from the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model including a momentum factor. This adjustment cuts the
alpha for the long-short decile portfolio roughly in half, from 22.7% to 12.0%, but it
remains strongly statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 4 illustrates the performance over time of the long-short portfolios that hold
the safest decile (quintile) of stocks and short the most distressed decile (quintile).
Performance is measured both by cumulative return, and by cumulative alpha or risk-
adjusted return from the Fama-French three-factor model. For comparison, we also
plot the cumulative return on the market portfolio. Raw returns to these portfolios
are concentrated in the late 1980’s and late 1990’s, with negative returns in the last
few years; however the alphas for these portfolios are much more consistent over
time.
The bottom panel of Table 6 reports characteristics of these portfolios. There is
a wide spread in failure risk across the portfolios. Stocks in the safest 5% have an
average failure probability of about 1 basis point, while stocks in the riskiest 5% have
a failure probability of 34 basis points and the 1% of riskiest stocks have a failure
probability of 80 basis points.
Stocks with a high risk of failure are highly volatile, with average standard de-
viations of almost 80% in the 5% most distressed stocks and 95% in the 1% most
distressed stocks. This volatility does not fully diversify at the portfolio level.14 The
excess return on the portfolio containing the 5% of stocks with the lowest failure risk
has an annual standard deviation of 11%, while the excess return for the portfolio
containing the 5% of stocks with the highest failure risk has a standard deviation of
26%, and the concentrated portfolio containing the 1% most distressed stocks has a
standard deviation of almost 40%. The returns on distressed stocks are also pos-
itively skewed, both at the portfolio level and particularly at the individual stock
level.
Distressed stocks are much smaller than safe stocks. The value-weighted average
size of the 5% safest stocks, reported in the table, is over 16 times larger than the
14On average there are slightly under 500 stocks for each 10% of the failure risk distribution,
so purely idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level risk should diversify well, leaving portfolio risk to be determined
primarily by common variation in distressed stock returns.
20value-weighted average size of the 5% most distressed stocks, and the equal-weighted
size is about 9 times larger. Market-book ratios are high at both extremes of the
failure risk distribution, and lower in the middle. This implies that distressed stocks
have the market-book ratios of growth stocks, but the factor loadings of value stocks,
since they load positively on the Fama-French value factor.
The wide spread in ﬁrm characteristics across the failure risk distribution suggests
the possibility that the apparent underperformance of distressed stocks results from
their characteristics rather than from ﬁnancial distress per se. For example, it could
be the case that extremely small stocks underperform in a manner that is not captured
by the Fama-French three-factor model. To explore this possibility, in Table 7 we
double-sort stocks, ﬁrst on size using NYSE quintile breakpoints, and then on failure
risk. In Table 8 we double-sort, ﬁrst on the book-market ratio using NYSE quintile
b r e a k p o i n t s ,a n dt h e no nf a i l u r er i s k .
Table 7 shows that distressed stocks underperform whether they are small stocks
or large stocks. The underperformance is, however, considerably stronger among
small stocks. The average return diﬀerence between the safest and most distressed
quintiles is three times larger when the stocks are in the smallest quintile as opposed
to the largest quintile. If we correct for risk using the Fama-French three-factor
model, the alpha diﬀerence between the safest and most distressed quintiles is about
50% greater in the smallest quintile than in the largest quintile. The table also shows
that in this sample period, there is only a weak size eﬀect among safe stocks, and
among distressed stocks large stocks outperform small stocks.
Table 8 shows that distressed stocks underperform whether they are growth stocks
or value stocks. The raw underperformance is more extreme and statistically signif-
icant among growth stocks, but this diﬀerence disappears when we correct for risk
using the Fama-French three-factor model. The value eﬀect is absent in the safest
stocks, similar to a result reported by Griﬃn and Lemmon (2002) using Ohlson’s O-
score to proxy for ﬁnancial distress. However this result may result from diﬀerences
in three-factor loadings, as it largely disappears when we correct for risk using the
three-factor model.
As a ﬁnal speciﬁcation check, we have sorted stocks on our measure of distance
to default. Contrary to the ﬁndings of Vassalou and Xing (2004), this sort also
generates low returns for distressed stocks, particularly after correction for risk using
the Fama-French three-factor model.
21Overall, these results are discouraging for the view that distress risk is positively
priced in the US stock market. We ﬁnd that stocks with a high risk of failure have
low average returns, despite their high loadings on small-cap and value risk factors.
4.1 What explains the low returns of distressed stocks?
What can explain the anomalous underperformance of distressed stocks? Perhaps the
most obvious explanation is that our predictors of ﬁnancial distress are correlated with
valuation errors. For example, investors may not have fully understood the relation
between our predictive variables and failure risk, and so may not have discounted the
prices of high-risk stocks enough to oﬀset their failure probability. Or, more simply,
investors may not have understood that the variables in our model predict low future
proﬁtability.
It is natural to suppose that valuation errors will disproportionately be resolved
by the information revealed in earnings announcements. La Porta (1996) and La
Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) showed that a large fraction of the
superior returns to value stocks are earned in short periods of time around earnings
announcements, and used this observation to argue that the value premium results
from mispricing. We have conducted a similar analysis for ﬁnancially distressed
stocks, reporting the results in Table 9. Panel A of the table shows the average
excess returns on the distressed-stock portfolios of Table 6, using only the returns
realized during a three-day window around earnings announcements. There is no
tendency for distressed-stock portfolios to do particularly poorly around earnings an-
nouncements; instead, the most distressed stocks actually outperform at these times,
possibly because the ability to announce earnings is itself good news for companies
that are in severe ﬁnancial diﬃculty. Panel B of Table 9 calculates excess returns
and alphas to distressed-stock portfolios, taking out the three-day windows around
earnings announcements. That is, we calculate the alphas for an investment strategy
that holds distressed stocks most of the time, but replaces them with factor portfo-
lios for three days around each stock’s earnings announcement. The alphas shown in
Panel B of Table 9 are almost identical to those reported in Table 6. These results
do not support the view that distressed stocks underperform because investors are
overoptimistic about their future earnings.
One might also suppose that valuation errors are more likely to be correlated
with sophisticated failure predictors, such as those we added to Shumway’s (2001)
22model, than with obvious predictors such as leverage and proﬁtability.15 The latter
variables have always been followed by practitioners, and academics have used them
to predict failure at least since the late 1960’s (Beaver 1966, Altman 1968). To
explore the relative importance of obvious and sophisticated variables, in Table 10
we report disaggregated estimates of the ability of each of our failure predictors to
forecast future stock returns. These estimates are based on repeated cross-sectional
multiple regressions of returns on the full set of failure predictors; following Fama and
MacBeth (1973), we report the time-series means of the cross-sectional coeﬃcients,
and standard errors computed from the time-series variability of those coeﬃcients.
For comparison, Table 10 also repeats the failure coeﬃcients reported in Table 4.
Column 1 of Table 10 predicts monthly returns using variables measured at the
start of each year, analogous to the sorting procedure we used in Table 9. In this
regression, all the explanatory variables enter signiﬁcantly with the exception of mar-
ket capitalization. Of the signiﬁcant variables, ﬁve enter with a sign opposite to that
in the failure prediction regression–that is, they contribute to the low returns on
distressed stocks–and two, leverage and stock price, enter with the same sign that
they have in the failure prediction regression. Highly leveraged stocks are more likely
to fail, but have delivered high average returns, while stocks with high prices are less
likely to fail, but have delivered low average returns. The former pattern may result
from the salience of leverage to even unsophisticated investors, while the latter may
reﬂect the value eﬀect, imperfectly captured by the market-book ratio, or the size ef-
fect, imperfectly captured by our measure of relative market capitalization. Column
2 of Table 10 repeats the regression using predictor variables measured at the start
of each month. Results are similar except that lagged returns no longer enter the
regression signiﬁcantly, perhaps because short-term reversal now oﬀsets medium-term
momentum.
Overall, Table 10 shows that the low returns to distressed stocks result from
many of the variables in our failure prediction model. They reﬂect more than just
momentum in stocks with bad news (Hong, Lim, and Stein 2000) or low returns to
volatile stocks (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 2005). Some of the standard variables
we include in our model, such as recent proﬁtability, are signiﬁcant return predictors,
implying that low returns to distressed stocks are not just the result of sophisticated
variables identiﬁed by our econometric analysis.
15In a similar spirit, Franzoni and Marin (2005) argue that ﬁrms with underfunded pension plans
underperform because pension plan funding status is not of obvious signiﬁcance to investors.
23More generally, the stocks that our model identiﬁes as distressed move with ag-
gregate market conditions in the way that one would expect if investors understand
them to be risky. Figure 5 plots the cumulative return to our portfolio long the safest
decile of stocks and short the riskiest decile, together with the implied volatility (VIX)
on the S&P 500 index, over the period since 1990 for which we have VIX data. The
correlation of the monthly portfolio return with the change in the VIX is 0.23. This
positive correlation is consistent with the view that investors “ﬂee to quality”, selling
distressed stocks, when market risk or risk aversion increase as measured by the VIX.
It is also consistent with the positive correlation between credit spreads and the VIX
documented in the literature on corporate bonds and credit default swaps (Berndt,
Douglas, Duﬃe, Ferguson, and Schranz 2005, Pan and Singleton 2005, Schaefer and
Strebulaev 2004). If investors were unable to distinguish between stocks with high
and low failure probabilities we would not expect this pattern.
Some investors may have motives to hold distressed stocks despite their tendency
to underperform. These motives are not captured by standard models of risk and
return, since we have shown that risk adjustment for size and value eﬀects worsens the
underperformance of distressed stocks, and adjustment for momentum reduces but
does not eliminate it. Adjustment for volatility risk (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang
2006) would also worsen the underperformance of distressed stocks since these stocks
do poorly when the VIX increases, and investors normally require compensation for
such a correlation.
Two other motives may be relevant, however. First, Barberis and Huang (2004)
model the behavior of investors whose preferences satisfy the cumulative prospect
theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Such investors have a strong desire to hold
positively skewed portfolios, and may even hold undiversiﬁed positions in positively
skewed assets. Barberis and Huang argue that this eﬀect can explain the high prices
and low average returns on IPO’s, whose returns are positively skewed. In a related
study, Zhang (2006) ﬁnds that industries with a positively skewed cross-sectional
return distribution tend to have low average returns. The same eﬀect could be
at work here, because Table 6 shows that both individual distressed stocks and our
portfolios of distressed stocks oﬀer returns with strong positive skewness. Second, von
Kalckreuth (2005) argues that majority owners of distressed companies can extract
private beneﬁts, for example by buying the company’s output or assets at bargain
prices. The incentive to extract such beneﬁts is greater when the company is unlikely
to survive and generate future proﬁts for its shareholders. Thus majority owners may
hold distressed stock, rather than selling it, because they earn a greater return than
24t h er e t u r nw em e a s u r et oo u t s i d es h a r e h o l d e r s .
These hypotheses have the potential to explain why some investors hold distressed
stocks despite their low average returns, but they do not explain why other rational
investors fail to arbitrage the distress anomaly. Some distressed stocks may be
unusually expensive or diﬃcult to short, but more important limits to arbitrage are
likely to be the reluctance of some investors to short stocks and the limited capital
that arbitrageurs have available.
Finally, the distress anomaly may result from unexpected developments during
our sample period. That is, it may be an in-sample phenomenon that is unlikely to
continue in the future. Our sample period generally had strong economic growth, so
it is not likely that macroeconomic news was worse than expected, but debtholders
may have become more adept at forcing bankruptcy or transferring resources from
equityholders to debtholders after default occurs.16
Another development that may have been unexpected is the strong shift of equity
ownership from individuals to institutions during this period. Kovtunenko and Sosner
(2003) have documented that institutions prefer to hold proﬁtable stocks, and that
this preference helped institutional performance during the 1980’s and 1990’s because
proﬁtable stocks outperformed the market. It is possible that the strong performance
of proﬁtable stocks in this period was endogenous, the result of demand for these
stocks by rapidly growing institutional investors. If institutions more generally prefer
stocks with low failure risk, and tend to sell stocks that enter ﬁnancial distress, then
a similar mechanism could drive our results.
Suggestive informal evidence in favor of this hypothesis is presented in Figure 6.
The ﬁgure shows the share of institutional ownership in the U.S. equity market, taken
from Binay (2005), along with the cumulative log return on a portfolio that is long
the 10% safest stocks, and short the 10% most distressed stocks. The ﬁgure shows
that safe stocks outperformed distressed stocks most strongly in periods such as the
late 1980’s when institutional ownership was growing rapidly, and underperformed
in periods such as the early 1990’s when institutional ownership was stable. The
correlation between the raw excess return to the 10% long-short portfolio and the
change in the institutional share is positive at 0.31.
16We thank Myron Scholes for suggesting this explanation of our results. Garlappi, Shu, and Yan
(2006) also emphasize the bargaining between equityholders and debtholders in bankruptcy.
25A full exploration of this hypothesis would require data on institutional ownership
at the ﬁrm level rather than the aggregate level, and would have to take account
of shifting institutional equity preferences (Bennett, Sias, and Starks 2003). Such
an exploration is beyond the scope of this paper, but appears to be an interesting
direction for future research.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature on ﬁnancial distress. First,
we carefully implement a reduced-form econometric model to predict corporate bank-
ruptcies and failures at short and long horizons. Our best model has greater explana-
tory power than the existing state-of-the-art models estimated by Shumway (2001)
and Chava and Jarrow (2004), and includes additional variables with sensible eco-
nomic motivation. We believe that models of the sort estimated here have meaningful
empirical advantages over the bankruptcy risk scores proposed by Altman (1968) and
Ohlson (1980). While Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s O-score were seminal early
contributions, better measures of bankruptcy risk are available today. We have also
presented evidence that failure risk cannot be adequately summarized by a measure of
distance to default inspired by Merton’s (1974) pioneering structural model. While
our distance to default measure is not exactly the same as those used by Crosbie
and Bohn (2001) and Vassalou and Xing (2004), we believe that this result, similar to
that reported independently by Bharath and Shumway (2004), is robust to alternative
measures of distance to default.
Second, we show that stocks with a high risk of failure tend to deliver anomalously
low average returns. We sort stocks by our 12-month-ahead estimate of failure risk,
calculated from a model that uses only historically available data at each point in
time. We calculate returns and risks on portfolios sorted by failure risk over the
period 1981-2003. Distressed portfolios have low average returns, but high standard
deviations, market betas, and loadings on Fama and French’s (1993) small-cap and
value risk factors. They also tend to do poorly when marketwide implied volatility
increases. Thus, from the perspective of any of the leading empirical asset pricing
models, these stocks have negative alphas. This result is a signiﬁcant challenge to the
conjecture that the value and size eﬀe c t sa r ep r o x i e sf o raﬁnancial distress premium.
More generally, it is a challenge to standard models of rational asset pricing in which
the structure of the economy is stable and well understood by investors.
26Some previous authors have reported evidence that distressed stocks underper-
form the market, but results have varied with the measure of ﬁnancial distress that
is used. Our results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Dichev (1998), who uses
Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s O-score to measure ﬁnancial distress, and Garlappi,
Shu, and Yan (2006), who obtain default risk measures from Moody’s KMV. Vas-
salou and Xing (2004) calculate distance to default; they ﬁnd some evidence that
distressed stocks with a low distance to default have higher returns, but this evidence
comes entirely from small value stocks. Da and Gao (2004) argue that Vassalou
and Xing’s distressed-stock returns are biased upwards by one-month reversal and
bid-ask bounce. Griﬃn and Lemmon (2002), using O-score to measure distress, ﬁnd
that distressed growth stocks have particularly low returns. Our measure of ﬁnan-
cial distress generates underperformance among distressed stocks in all quintiles of
the size and value distributions, but the underperformance is more dramatic among
small stocks and growth stocks.
We have discussed a number of possible explanations for the anomalously low
returns on distressed stocks. One simple story is that investors make valuation errors,
overpricing these stocks because they fail to understand their poor prospects. This
simple story may be correct, but we do not ﬁnd that valuation errors are corrected
when distressed stocks make earnings announcements, and we do not ﬁnd any strong
tendency for poor returns to be associated with the more subtle and less obvious
variables in our failure prediction model. Another possibility is that distressed stocks
have characteristics that appeal to certain investors, such as increased opportunities
to extract private beneﬁts of control (von Kalckreuth 2005) or positive skewness of
returns (Barberis and Huang 2004, Zhang 2006). We have no direct evidence that
distressed stocks oﬀer private beneﬁts to majority shareholders, but we do ﬁnd that
these stocks oﬀer positively skewed returns whether they are held in concentrated or
diversiﬁed portfolios. Finally, it is possible that unexpected developments during our
sample period–such as increased power to debtholders in bankruptcy, or increased
equity ownership by institutions with a preference for safe stocks–have driven down
the prices of distressed stocks. We have shown that indeed distressed stocks have
tended to perform particularly poorly in periods when institutional equity ownership
is increasing rapidly. To the extent that this explanation is important, the poor
performance of distressed stocks is a transitional phenomenon that could disappear
or even reverse if institutional ownership stabilizes.
27Appendix
In this appendix we discuss issues related to the construction of our dataset. All
variables are constructed using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data. Relative size, excess
return, and accounting ratios are deﬁned as follows:
RSIZEi,t =l o g
µ
FirmMarketEquityi,t
Total S&P500 Market Valuet
¶









(FirmMarketEquityi,t + Total Liabilitiesi,t)
TLMTAi,t =
Total Liabilitiesi,t
(FirmMarketEquityi,t + Total Liabilitiesi,t)
CASHMTAi,t =
Cash and Short Term Investmentsi,t
(FirmMarketEquityi,t + Total Liabilitiesi,t)
The COMPUSTAT quarterly data items used are Data44 for total assets, Data69 for
net income, and Data54 for total liabilities.
To deal with outliers in the data, we correct both NITA and TLTA using the
diﬀerence between book equity (BE) and market equity (ME) to adjust the value of
total assets:
Total Assets (adjusted)i,t = TAi,t +0 .1 ∗ (BEi,t − MEi,t)
Book equity is as deﬁned in Davis, Fama and French (2000) and outlined in detail in
Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003). This transformation helps with the values of
total assets that are very small, probably mismeasured and lead to very large values
of NITA. After total assets are adjusted, each of the seven explanatory variables is
winsorized using a 5/95 percentile interval in order to eliminate outliers.
To measure the volatility of a ﬁrm’s stock returns, we use a proxy, centered around
zero rather than the rolling three-month mean, for daily variation of returns computed















To eliminate cases where few observations are available, SIGMA is coded as missing
if there are fewer than ﬁve non-zero observations over the three months used in
the rolling-window computation. In calculating summary statistics and estimating
regressions, we replace missing SIGMA observations with the cross-sectional mean of
SIGMA; this helps us avoid losing some failure observations for infrequently traded
companies. A dummy for missing SIGMA does not enter our regressions signiﬁcantly.
We use a similar procedure for missing lags of NIMTA and EXRET in constructing
the moving average variables NIMTAAVG and EXRETAVG.
In order to calculate distance to default we need to estimate asset value and asset
volatility, neither of which are directly observable. We construct measures of these
variables by solving two equations simultaneously.
First, in the Merton model equity is valued as a European call option on the value
of the ﬁrm’s assets. Then:
















d2 = d1 − SIGMADD
√
T,
where TADD is the value of assets, SIGMADD is the volatility of assets, ME is the
value of equity, and BD is the face value of debt maturing at time T. Following
convention in the literature on the Merton model (Crosbie and Bohn 2001, Vassalou
and Xing 2004), we assume T =1 , and use short term plus one half long term book
debt to proxy for the face value of debt BD. T h i sc o n v e n t i o ni sas i m p l ew a yt ot a k e
account of the fact that long-term debt may not mature until after the horizon of the
distance to default calculation. We measure the risk free rate RBILL as the Treasury
bill rate.
The second equation is a relation between the volatility of equity and the volatility
of assets, often referred to as the optimal hedge equation:




29As starting values for asset value and asset volatility, we use TA DD = ME+BD,a n d
SIGMADD = SIGMA(ME/(ME+BD)).17 We iterate until we have found values
for TA DD and SIGMADD that are consistent with the observed values of ME, BD,
and SIGMA.
Finally, we compute distance to default as
DD =





The number 0.06 appears in the formula as an empirical proxy for the equity premium.
Vassalou and Xing (2004) instead estimate the average return on each stock, while
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lunstedt (2004) calculate the drift as the return on
assets during the previous year. If the estimated expected return is negative, they
replace it with the riskfree interest rate. We believe that it is better to use a common
expected return for all stocks than a noisily estimated stock-speciﬁcn u m b e r .
17If BD is missing, we use BD = median(BD/TL) ∗ TL, where the median is calculated for the
entire data set. This captures the fact that empirically, BD tends to be much smaller than TL.I f
BD =0 ,w eu s eBD = median(BD/TL) ∗ TL, where now we calculate the median only for small
but nonzero values of BD (0 <B D<0.01). If SIGMA is missing, we replace it with its cross
sectional mean. Before calculating asset value and volatility, we adjust BD so that BD/(ME+BD)
is winsorized at the 0.5% level. We also winsorize SIGMA at the 0.5% level. This signiﬁcantly
reduces instances in which the search algorithm does not converge.
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36Year Active Firms Bankruptcy (%) Failure (%)
1963 1281 0 0.00 0 0.00
1964 1357 2 0.15 2 0.15
1965 1436 2 0.14 2 0.14
1966 1513 1 0.07 1 0.07
1967 1598 0 0.00 0 0.00
1968 1723 0 0.00 0 0.00
1969 1885 0 0.00 0 0.00
1970 2067 5 0.24 5 0.24
1971 2199 4 0.18 4 0.18
1972 2650 8 0.30 8 0.30
1973 3964 6 0.15 6 0.15
1974 4002 18 0.45 18 0.45
1975 4038 5 0.12 5 0.12
1976 4101 14 0.34 14 0.34
1977 4157 12 0.29 12 0.29
1978 4183 14 0.33 15 0.36
1979 4222 14 0.33 14 0.33
1980 4342 26 0.60 26 0.60
1981 4743 23 0.48 23 0.48
1982 4995 29 0.58 29 0.58
1983 5380 50 0.93 50 0.93
1984 5801 73 1.26 74 1.28
1985 5912 76 1.29 77 1.30
1986 6208 95 1.53 95 1.53
1987 6615 54 0.82 54 0.82
1988 6686 84 1.26 85 1.27
1989 6603 74 1.12 78 1.18
1990 6515 80 1.23 82 1.26
1991 6571 70 1.07 73 1.11
1992 6914 45 0.65 50 0.72
1993 7469 36 0.48 39 0.52
1994 8067 30 0.37 33 0.41
1995 8374 43 0.51 45 0.54
1996 8782 32 0.36 34 0.39
1997 9544 44 0.46 61 0.64
1998 9844 49 0.50 150 1.52
1999 9675 . . 209 2.16
2000 9426 . . 167 1.77
2001 8817 . . 324 3.67
2002 8242 . . 221 2.68
2003 7833 . . 167 2.13
Table 1: Number of bankruptcies and failures per year
The table lists the total number of active firms (Column 1), total number of 
bankruptcies (Column 2) and failures (Column 4) for every year of our sample period. 
The number of active firms is computed by averaging over the numbers of active firms 
across all months of the year. Entire dataset
NITA NIMTA TLTA TLMTA EXRET RSIZE SIGMA CASHMTA MB PRICE
Mean -0.001 0.000 0.506 0.445 -0.011 -10.456 0.562 0.084 2.041 2.019
Median 0.007 0.006 0.511 0.427 -0.009 -10.570 0.471 0.045 1.557 2.474
St. Dev 0.034 0.023 0.252 0.280 0.117 1.922 0.332 0.097 1.579 0.883
Min -0.102 -0.069 0.083 0.036 -0.243 -13.568 0.153 0.002 0.358 -0.065
Max 0.039 0.028 0.931 0.923 0.218 -6.773 1.353 0.358 6.471 2.708
Observations: 1,695,036
Bankruptcy group
NITA NIMTA TLTA TLMTA EXRET RSIZE SIGMA CASHMTA MB PRICE
Mean -0.054 -0.040 0.796 0.763 -0.115 -12.416 1.061 0.044 2.430 0.432
Median -0.054 -0.047 0.872 0.861 -0.171 -12.876 1.255 0.021 1.018 -0.065
St. Dev 0.043 0.030 0.174 0.210 0.148 1.345 0.352 0.062 2.509 0.760
Observations: 797
Failure group
NITA NIMTA TLTA TLMTA EXRET RSIZE SIGMA CASHMTA MB PRICE
Mean -0.059 -0.044 0.738 0.731 -0.105 -12.832 1.167 0.072 2.104 0.277
Median -0.066 -0.062 0.821 0.842 -0.179 -13.568 1.353 0.029 0.751 -0.065
St. Dev 0.043 0.030 0.228 0.239 0.162 1.168 0.303 0.099 2.389 0.643
Observations: 1614
The tables include the following variables (various adjustments are described in the data description section): net income over book value of total assets (NITA), 
net income over market value of total assets (NIMTA), total liabilities over book value of total tssets (TLTA), total liabilities over market value of total assets 
(TLMTA),  log of gross excess return over value weighted S&P 500 return (EXRET) annualized, i.e. log(1+simple excess return), log of firm’s market equity over 
the total valuation of S&P 500 (RSIZE), square root of a sum of squared firm stock returns over a three-month period (annualized) (SIGMA), stock of cash and 
short term investments over the market value of total assets (CASHMTA), market-to-book value of the firm (MB) and log of price per share winsorized above $15 
(PRICE). Market value of total assets was computed by adding market value of firm equity to its total liabilities. The first group reports summary statistics for all 
firm-month observations and the other two for bankruptcy and failure grups. We have a total of 1,695,036 observations, of which 797 are bankruptcy and 1614 
are failure events. In both cases, the panels only contain statistics for values where all variables were non-missing.
Table 2: Summary statistics(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep variable: Bankruptcy Failure Failure Bankruptcy Failure Failure
Sample period: 1963-1998 1963-1998 1963-2003 1963-1998 1963-1998 1963-2003
NITA -14.05 -13.79 -12.782
(16.03)** (17.06)** (21.26)**
NIMTAAVG -32.518 -32.457 -29.672
(17.65)** (19.01)** (23.37)**
TLTA 5.378 4.62 3.744
(25.91)** (26.28)** (32.32)**
TLMTA 4.322 3.865 3.36
(22.82)** (23.39)** (27.80)**
EXRET -3.297 -2.903 -2.319
(12.12)** (11.81)** (13.57)**
EXRETAVG -9.51 -8.819 -7.35
(12.05)** (12.08)** (14.03)**
SIGMA 2.148 2.28 2.763 0.92 1.15 1.482
(16.40)** (18.34)** (26.63)** (6.66)** (8.79)** (13.54)**
RSIZE -0.188 -0.253 -0.374 0.246 0.169 0.082
(5.56)** (7.60)** (13.26)** (6.18)** (4.32)** (2.62)**
CASHMTA -4.888 -3.218 -2.401
(7.96)** (6.59)** (8.64)**
MB 0.099 0.095 0.054
(6.72)** (6.76)** (4.87)**
PRICE -0.882 -0.807 -0.937
(10.39)** (10.09)** (14.77)**
Constant -15.214 -15.41 -16.576 -7.648 -8.45 -9.079
(39.45)** (40.87)** (50.92)** (13.66)** (15.63)** (20.84)**
Observations 1282853 1302564 1695036 1282853 1302564 1695036
Failures 797 911 1614 797 911 1614
Pseudo R2 0.260 0.258 0.270 0.299 0.296 0.312
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 3: Logit regressions on predictor variables 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy and failure indicator on predictor 
variables. The value of the predictor variable is known at the beginning of the month over which 
bankruptcy is measured.  Net income and total liabilities are scaled by accounting and market total 
assets. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag (months) 0 6 12 24 36
NIMTAAVG -29.672 -23.915 -20.264 -13.232 -14.061
(23.37)** (21.82)** (18.09)** (10.50)** (9.77)**
TLMTA 3.36 2.057 1.416 0.917 0.643
(27.80)** (22.63)** (16.23)** (9.85)** (6.25)**
EXRETAVG -7.35 -7.792 -7.129 -5.607 -2.564
(14.03)** (15.97)** (14.15)** (10.14)** (4.14)**
SIGMA 1.482 1.268 1.411 1.515 1.334
(13.54)** (14.57)** (16.49)** (16.92)** (13.54)**
RSIZE 0.082 0.047 -0.045 -0.132 -0.18
(2.62)** (2.02)* (2.09)* (6.19)** (8.03)**
CASHMTA -2.401 -2.397 -2.132 -1.37 -1.414
(8.64)** (9.77)** (8.53)** (5.09)** (4.61)**
MB 0.054 0.047 0.075 0.108 0.125
(4.87)** (4.22)** (6.33)** (7.92)** (8.17)**
PRICE -0.937 -0.468 -0.058 0.212 0.279
(14.77)** (10.36)** (1.40) (4.96)** (6.00)**
Constant -9.079 -8.069 -9.164 -10.233 -10.534
(20.84)** (25.00)** (30.89)** (34.48)** (33.53)**
Observations 1695036 1642006 1565634 1384951 1208610
Failures 1614 2008 1968 1730 1467
Pseudo R sq 0.312 0.188 0.114 0.061 0.044
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4: Logit regressions on lagged variables
The table below takes our best-model variables and tests their predictive power as we lag them by 6, 12, 
24, and 36 months. The dependent variable is failure and the sample period is 1963-2003.Panel A - Coefficients
(1) (2) (3)
Lag (months) 0 12 36
DD only -0.883 -0.345 -0.165
(39.73)** (33.73)** (20.88)**
DD in best model 0.048 -0.091 -0.09
(2.62)** (7.52)** (8.09)**
Observations 1695036 1565634 1208610
Failures 1614 1968 1467
Panel B - R squared
(1) (2) (3)
In-sample (1963 - 2003)
DD only 0.159 0.066 0.026
Best model 0.312 0.114 0.044
DD in Best model 0.312 0.117 0.045
Out-of-sample (1981 - 2003)
DD only 0.156 0.064 0.025
Best model 0.310 0.108 0.039
Table 5: Distance to default and our best model
In panel A we report the coefficients on distance to default variable in a logit regression by itself and 
included in our best model. The dependent variable is failure and the sample period is 1963-2003. 
Regression results are reported for various horizons: 0, 12, and 36 months. Panel B reports the in-sample 
and out-of-sample pseudo-R squared for the regressions from panel A.Panel A - Portfolio alphas
Portfolios 0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900 LS1090 LS2080
Mean excess return 3.39 2.36 1.25 0.93 0.50 -0.16 -4.44 -8.07 -6.63 -16.30 10.20 6.72
(1.45) (1.08) (1.06) (1.02) (0.34) (0.07) (1.26) (1.72) (1.24) (1.98)* (1.90) (1.53)
CAPM alpha 2.74 2.04 1.40 1.50 0.46 -1.53 -6.67 -10.96 -9.45 -18.71 12.60 8.98
(1.17) (0.92) (1.17) (1.69) (0.31) (0.68) (1.95) (2.40)* (1.79) (2.27)* (2.36)* (2.08)*
3-factor alpha 5.70 5.30 2.65 0.76 -2.13 -5.77 -12.73 -18.15 -16.13 -24.25 22.89 17.43
(2.95)** (2.85)** (2.34)* (0.95) (1.72) (3.26)** (4.64)** (5.75)** (3.93)** (3.35)** (6.15)** (5.41)**
4-factor alpha 2.37 2.66 1.49 2.01 0.65 -1.21 -5.80 -10.01 -8.19 -20.39 12.18 8.19
(1.19) (1.37) (1.24) (2.42)* (0.53) (0.70) (2.16)* (3.26)** (1.96) (2.64)** (3.45)** (2.68)**
Panel B - 3-factor regression coefficients
Portfolios 0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900 LS1090 LS2080
RM -0.083 -0.111 -0.058 -0.028 0.103 0.334 0.479 0.476 0.431 0.254 -0.563 -0.553
(2.22)* (3.10)** (2.65)** (1.82) (4.33)** (9.77)** (9.04)** (7.81)** (5.45)** (1.82) (7.82)** (8.88)**
HML -0.474 -0.499 -0.176 0.122 0.379 0.613 0.849 0.918 0.831 0.608 -1.396 -1.183
(9.68)** (10.61)** (6.16)** (6.00)** (12.14)** (13.70)** (12.23)** (11.50)** (8.02)** (3.32)** (14.82)** (14.51)**
SMB 0.212 0.037 -0.117 -0.091 0.121 0.263 0.591 1.466 1.538 1.964 -1.394 -0.833
(3.89)** (0.71) (3.68)** (4.03)** (3.49)** (5.29)** (7.66)** (16.51)** (13.34)** (9.64)** (13.31)** (9.19)**
Panel C - Portfolio characteristics
Portfolios 0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900 LS1090 LS2080
Portfolio SD 0.112 0.105 0.057 0.044 0.071 0.111 0.169 0.225 0.257 0.394 0.258 0.211
Portfolio skewness 1.112 0.327 0.425 -0.262 -0.130 -0.275 1.040 1.749 2.393 1.856
Individual SD 0.360 0.351 0.304 0.288 0.306 0.370 0.508 0.684 0.777 0.941
Individual skewness 0.633 0.754 0.584 0.991 1.056 0.838 1.560 3.742 1.751 2.480
Mean RSIZE -7.786 -7.479 -7.236 -7.172 -7.371 -7.803 -8.744 -10.000 -10.584 -11.273
Mean MB 2.648 3.089 2.945 2.499 2.117 1.989 2.256 2.611 3.114 3.783
Mean Phat 0.011% 0.014% 0.018% 0.024% 0.036% 0.057% 0.11% 0.19% 0.34% 0.80%
Table 6: Returns on distressed stock portfolios
We sort all stocks based on the predicted 12-month probability of failure and divide them into 10 portfolios based on percentile cutoffs. For example, 0 to 5th percentile (0005) and 99th to 
100th percentile (9900). In the table below we show results from regressions of value weighted excess returns over the market on a constant, market return (RM), as well as three (RM, HML, 
SMB) and four (RM, HML, SMB, UMD) FF factor regressions.  Panel A shows monthly alphas (in annualized percent units) from these regressions and the corresponding t-stats below.  Panel 
B shows loadings on the three factors, as well as corresponding t-stats below, from the 3-factor regression.  Panel C reports annualized standard deviation and skewness of individual and 
portfolio returns,  mean relative size (RSIZE), market-to-book (MB), and probability of failure (Phat) values for each portfolio.Panel A - mean excess return
ME\Phat Low High Low - High
Large 3.91 -1.49 -0.32 0.35 0.89 3.02
(2.01)* (1.19) (0.22) (0.24) (0.39) (0.77)
4.09 0.22 1.98 0.71 1.04 3.05
(2.00)* (0.16) (1.36) (0.52) (0.40) (0.78)
4.58 2.86 -0.32 0.89 0.35 4.23
(1.98)* (1.48) (0.21) (0.57) (0.14) (1.25)
6.01 2.46 1.62 0.84 -2.58 8.60
(2.42)* (1.16) (0.77) (0.43) (0.93) (2.91)**
Small 3.72 -0.32 -3.44 -6.09 -10.72 10.78
(2.10)* (1.21) (1.14) (0.24) (1.26) (3.05)**
Large - Small -1.18 -4.48 -3.05 -0.37 6.59
(0.40) (1.43) (0.94) (0.10) (1.36)
Panel B - 3-factor alpha
ME\Phat Low High Low - High
Large 7.48 0.29 0.35 -1.66 -4.12 11.60
(4.81)** (0.27) (0.31) (1.47) (2.44)* (4.07)**
6.15 0.91 1.40 -0.66 -5.43 11.58
(3.93)** (0.73) (0.99) (0.55) (2.85)** (4.06)**
6.06 3.99 -1.24 -1.02 -5.92 11.98
(3.98)** (3.03)** (1.11) (0.82) (3.90)** (5.03)**
6.50 2.41 0.59 -1.21 -8.69 15.19
(4.92)** (2.00)* (0.53) (1.13) (6.01)** (7.07)**
Small 5.07 2.80 0.97 -3.16 -12.34 17.42
(4.24)** (2.29)* (0.81) (1.95) (4.21)** (5.80)**
Large - Small 2.40 -2.52 -0.62 1.51 8.22
(1.34) (1.55) (0.39) (0.79) (2.65)**
This table reports mean excess returns over the market and 3-factor alphas for portfolios sorted on size (ME) 
and fitted 12-month fitted probability of failure (Phat). We first sort stocks into size quintiles using NYSE 
breakpoints (following Fama-French) and then, within each quintile, sort stocks into predicted failure 
probability quintiles. All returns are in annualized percent units.
Table 7: Double sorting on size and distressPanel A - mean excess return
BM\Phat Low High Low - High
High 4.34 3.06 6.41 -1.18 -5.19 9.53
(2.39)* (1.32) (2.05)* (0.28) (0.97) (1.67)
5.62 3.80 3.13 6.60 -0.79 6.42
(2.78)** (1.86) (1.50) (2.41)* (0.19) (1.29)
2.50 2.10 2.21 1.15 -4.53 7.02
(1.54) (1.22) (1.27) (0.48) (1.33) (1.84)
2.64 -0.39 -0.53 -0.89 -3.34 5.98
(1.31) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.92) (1.24)
Low 3.72 -0.32 -3.44 -6.09 -10.72 14.44
(1.70) (0.20) (1.80) (2.34)* (2.83)** (3.02)**
High - Low 0.62 3.38 9.85 4.91 5.53
(0.19) (1.06) (2.81)** (1.17) (1.27)
Panel B - 3-factor alpha
BM\Phat Low High Low - High
High 4.00 0.36 0.55 -10.51 -16.14 20.14
(2.55)* (0.20) (0.22) (3.15)** (4.33)** (4.89)**
5.76 3.22 0.54 0.76 -9.32 15.08
(3.29)** (2.35)* (0.33) (0.38) (2.84)** (3.60)**
2.90 2.36 0.20 -3.14 -12.00 14.90
(1.88) (1.64) (0.14) (1.60) (4.38)** (4.58)**
4.47 -0.87 -2.37 -5.26 -10.54 15.01
(2.66)** (0.73) (1.68) (2.38)* (3.36)** (3.58)**
Low 7.21 1.12 -5.19 -10.52 -18.13 25.34
(4.47)** (0.78) (2.73)** (4.60)** (6.00)** (6.81)**
High - Low -3.21 -0.77 5.74 0.01 1.99
(1.40) (0.34) (1.85) (0.00) (0.50)
Table 8: Double sorting on value and distress
This table reports mean excess returns over the market and 3-factor alphas for portfolios sorted on book-to-
market (BM) and fitted 12-month fitted probability of failure (Phat). We first sort stocks into book-to-market 
quintiles using NYSE breakpoints (following Fama-French) and then, within each quintile, sort stocks into 
predicted failure probability quintiles. All returns are in annualized percent units.Panel A - 3 day returns
Portfolios 0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900
Mean excess return 0.413 0.104 0.024 0.034 -0.010 0.101 0.146 0.424 0.197 0.111
(7.37)** (1.89) (0.64) (1.29) (0.37) (3.16)** (2.61)** (4.39)** (1.53) (0.34)
Panel B - Earnings-Announcement-Adjusted Portfolio Alphas
Portfolios 0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900 LS1090 LS2080
Mean excess return 2.61 2.31 0.74 0.35 -0.46 -0.29 -3.49 -9.25 -6.20 -15.17 10.49 5.65
(1.18) (1.13) (0.65) (0.39) (0.33) (0.13) (1.00) (2.07)* (1.17) (1.91) (2.03)* (1.31)
CAPM alpha 1.99 2.01 0.87 0.90 -0.49 -1.71 -5.64 -12.14 -8.88 -17.28 12.88 7.84
(0.91) (0.99) (0.76) (1.02) (0.35) (0.77) (1.67) (2.82)** (1.72) (2.19)* (2.54)* (1.87)
3-factor alpha 4.87 5.18 2.13 0.20 -3.04 -5.84 -11.58 -19.03 -15.36 -23.16 22.79 16.10
(2.78)** (3.07)** (2.02)* (0.25) (2.74)** (3.43)** (4.43)** (6.36)** (3.94)** (3.36)** (6.51)** (5.29)**
4-factor alpha 1.59 2.62 0.99 1.43 -0.31 -1.32 -4.81 -11.02 -7.53 -19.41 12.27 7.03
(0.93) (1.59) (0.94) (1.84) (0.29) (0.86) (1.99)* (4.00)** (2.03)* (2.82)** (3.90)** (2.56)*
Table 9: Earnings Announcement Returns
We sort all stocks based on the predicted 12-month probability of failure and divide them into 10 portfolios based on percentile cutoffs (same as in Table 6).  For example, 0 to 5th 
percentile (0005) and 99th to 100th percentile (9900).  Panel A reports 3-day (t-1,t+1) excess returns over the equally weighted market index during earnings annoucements.  In Panel B 
we calculate portfolio returns assuming that we hold factor portfolios during earnings announcement windows using the estimated factor loadings from Table 6.  We report earnings-
announcement-adjusted mean excess returns over the market, as well as one factor (RM), three FF factor (RM, HML, SMB) and four factor (RM, HML, SMB, UMD) alphas (in 
annualized percent units) and the corresponding t-stat below.  Panel A - Return prediction Panel B - Failure prediction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag (months) 0 6 12
NIMTAAVG 14.55 38.99 -29.67 -23.92 -20.26
(4.09)** (11.02)** (23.37)** (21.82)** (18.09)**
TLMTA 0.58 0.74 3.36 2.06 1.42
(2.76)** (3.65)** (27.80)** (22.63)** (16.23)**
EXRETAVG 11.50 0.88 -7.35 -7.79 -7.13
(6.78)** (0.40) (14.03)** (15.97)** (14.15)**
SIGMA -0.96 -2.05 1.48 1.27 1.41
(2.68)** (5.85)** (13.54)** (14.57)** (16.49)**
RSIZE 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.05 -0.05
(0.48) (0.45) (2.62)** (2.02)* (2.09)*
CASHMTA 2.93 4.33 -2.40 -2.40 -2.13
(8.49)** (11.42)** (8.64)** (9.77)** (8.53)**
MB -0.19 -0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08
(6.61)** (1.59) (4.87)** (4.22)** (6.33)**
PRICE -0.62 -0.80 -0.94 -0.47 -0.06
(5.41)** (6.64)** (14.77)** (10.36)** (1.40)
Absolute value of z or t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%







This table reports coefficients on explanatory variables when predicting failure and equity returns.  Panel A reports coefficients 
from Fama-MacBeth return prediction regressions.  We run monthly regressions of returns on characteristics and a constant for 
the sample of returns included in portfolios in Table 6, i.e. for the period 1981-2003.  We average the individual coefficients over 
time and report the mean and standard error of the mean in percent.  We run regressions both using beginning of year and 
beginning of month characteristics.  In Panel B we report coefficients from taking our best-model variables and predicting failure 
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